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The trouble with 'ethnicity' 
NEIL DAVIDSON 
The concept of exploitation is central to the Marxist understanding of history and 
contemporary society. But not all social conflicts can be immediately reduced to 
the struggle between exploiters and exploited, and to explain these conflicts we 
require other concepts. The most important is that of oppression. This refers to 
systematic discrimination by one social group against another on the grounds of 
characteristics either inherited (skin colour, gender) or socially acquired (religious 
belief, sexual orientation). The experience of oppression cuts across class lines, 
although that experience is more or less severe depending on where its victims are 
placed within the class structure. Some forms, like the oppression of women, have 
persisted throughout the existence of class society, while others, like racism, are 
specific to capitalism alone. Sometimes the reasons, or pretexts, for the oppression 
of a group may change over time. During the feudal era, for example, Jewish 
people were persecuted for their religious beliefs, but as capitalism developed 
persecution increasingly took place on the grounds of their supposed race. 
Whatever the reason or pretext, however, ruling classes throughout history have 
instigated or endorsed the oppression of different groups in order to maintain or 
create divisions amongst those over whom they rule. Recently, groups have 
increasingly been subjected to oppression on the grounds of their ethnicity. The 
most extreme form of such oppression has become known as 'ethnic cleansing'. 
The term 'ethnic cleansing' is an English translation of the Serbo-Croat 
phrase etnicko ciscenje. It was first used in Yugoslavia, not in the conflicts which 
erupted after the end of the Cold War, but by the Croatian Ustashe during the 
Second World War to describe its policy of killing or expelling Serbs, Jews, 
Gypsies and Muslims from the fascist state the Ustashe briefly set up with Nazi 
support. The first use during the current events was by the Croatian Supreme 
Council in 1991, after the Croatian declaration of independence from Yugoslavia, 
to describe the actions of Serb guerrillas who were attempting to drive Croats out 
of areas where Serbs were in the majority: 'The aim of this expulsion is obviously 
the 'ethnic cleansing' of the critical areas [to] be annexed to Serbia.' The phrase 
only began to appear in the British press--and thereafter in popular usage--during 
the war which began in Bosnia-Hercegovina the following year, when Bosnian 
Serb forces, initially backed by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, started expelling 
Muslims and Croats from those parts of the state territory that the Bosnian Serbs 
considered to be Serbian.1 
Since then the term has been used not just to describe events in former Yugoslavia 
(where all sides became involved in the practice to some extent), but in similar--
and in some cases even worse--occurrences distant in space and time. On the one 
hand, the term was being extended spatially to events, such as the massacres in 
Rwanda during 1994, which took place in societies geographically distant from 
Yugoslavia and were quite different in terms of their historical development. On 
the other hand, the term was also extended chronologically back to events, such as 
the expulsion and killing of Armenians by Turks at the end of the First World War, 
that were historically distant and had not previously been discussed in these terms.2 
'Ethnic cleansing' presupposes the existence of different ethnic groups. The 
majority of people who opposed the bombing of Yugoslavia also opposed the 
'ethnic cleansing' of Kosovan Albanians which NATO used to justify it, arguing 
that it both intensified the hatreds which made ethnic cleansing possible and made 
it easier to carry out by forcing the removal of the international monitors who had 
provided some check on the Serb paramilitaries. However, the opponents of the 
war tended to share with supporters of the war--and indeed with the people 
carrying out the 'ethnic cleansing'--the view that there were genuine ethnic 
differences between groups in former Yugoslavia. From the anti-war perspective, 
ethnic differences such as those between the Serbs and the Kosovan Albanians 
should be mutually respected rather than made the occasion for oppression, but the 
differences themselves could and should not be denied. This position is inadequate, 
and I want to argue instead that we need to go beyond opposition to 'ethnic 
cleansing'--which of course means all 'ethnic cleansing', not only that of the 
Kosovan Albanians--and question the validity of the term ethnicity itself. 
Since the argument that follows may be liable to misrepresentation, I should 
perhaps make one central point clear from the start. Ethnicity is often equated with 
culture, most frequently with that of minority populations in Western Europe and 
North America, or with non-Western cultures more generally. Older readers may 
remember a time in the late 1960s and early 1970s when Guatemalan pottery or 
Afghan textiles were regularly described as 'ethnic' when being marketed in 
Britain, as if 'ethnicity' was some special property which they possessed. I am not 
arguing against cultural diversity, still less suggesting that socialists should 
abandon their duty to defend people whose culture is under threat, or who are 
suffering from any of the other forms of oppression outlined above. Nearly 100 
years ago, Lenin pointed out the necessity for socialists to be 'tribunes of the 
people' in words which still retain their relevance: 'Working class consciousness 
cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond 
to all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence and abuse, no matter what class is 
affected--unless they are trained, moreover, to respond from a social democratic [ie 
revolutionary socialist] point of view and no other'.3 For socialists, therefore, it 
makes no difference whether particular groups of people are oppressed because of 
their language, religion, nationhood, or ethnicity. In each case our duty is to defend 
the oppressed and show solidarity with them, particularly where socialists 
themselves belong to the dominant linguistic, religious, national or--assuming for 
the moment that such a thing exists--ethnic group. 
My point is rather that the way in which the notion of 'ethnicity' is currently and 
increasingly being used contains a number of problems for the left. Two stand out 
in particular. On the on hand, those who approve of ethnicity as the affirmation of 
a cultural identity, in so far as they emphasise supposedly innate differences 
between human social groups, are in danger of opening the door to the current 
form of racist ideology. On the other hand, those who disapprove of ethnicity as a 
manifestation of (real or imagined) exclusionist tribalism are in danger, in so far as 
they suggest that 'ethnic' nationalisms are particularly prone to oppressive 
behaviour, of obscuring those characteristics which all nationalisms have in 
common, whether they are oppressor, oppressed, or fall into neither of these 
categories. Our first task is therefore to distinguish between the various ways in 
which the term 'ethnicity' has been used, and assess their respective validity. 
Kinship, occupation and identity 
'Ethnicity' has been defined in three ways: first, where members of a group have a 
common line of descent, and consequently a shared kinship; second, where they 
have a common position within the international division of labour and 
consequently a shared occupation; third, where they have one or more cultural 
attributes in common and consequently a shared identity. The first and second 
reasons assume that ethnicity can be defined objectively, the third that it can be 
defined subjectively. As we shall see, it is this subjective definition which is 
currently dominant. 
Kinship: Social groups which share a common line of descent are usually referred 
to in anthropology as endogamous groups, or groups whose members interbreed 
exclusively with each other, thus maintaining the same genetic inheritance. Such 
groups would have been universal at the origins of human evolution but are, 
however, virtually impossible to find today. Indeed, recent archaeological and 
anthropological work suggests that mass human migration--often across entire 
continents--occurred much earlier in history than was previously believed, and 
resulted in the erosion of endogamy within the original tribal societies. One writer 
notes that as a result of these factors, within tribal society 'the common ancestry of 
"the people" was always partially fictive'.4 But once we move onto the terrain of 
recorded history the multiple genetic inheritance of the global population is an 
indisputable fact that also makes the existence of different 'races' impossible to 
sustain. Susan Reynolds has rightly criticised the tendency among medieval 
historians to describe the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire as biologically 
distinct 'tribal' entities, simply because of the continued use of their original group 
name. 'This must be wrong,' she points out. 'Once barbarians had been converted to 
orthodox Christianity and prohibitions on intermarriage had been lifted, it must 
have been hard to distinguish them from "Romans" who were already mixed 
genetically and were increasingly barbarised culturally'.5 
The main constituent nations of Britain are a case in point. Early in the 18th 
century Daniel Defoe mocked the pretensions of his countrymen to ethnic purity in 
his satirical poem, 'The True-Born Englishman': 
In eager rapes, and furious lust begot, 
Between a painted Briton and a Scot: 
Whose gen'ring offspring quickly learnt to bow. 
And yoke their heifers to the Roman plough: 
From whence a mongrel half-bred race there came, 
With neither name nor nation, speech or fame: 
In whose hot veins now mixtures quickly ran, 
Infus'd betwixt a Saxon and a Dane. 
While their rank daughters, to their parents just, 
Receiv'd all nations with promiscuous lust. 
This nauseous brood directly did contain, 
The well-extracted blood of Englishmen. 
As Linda Colley comments, 'Defoe's uncompromising insistence on the ethnic 
diversity of England, its early exposure to successive invasions from continental 
Europe, and the constant intermingling of its people with the Welsh and Scots, was 
fully justified in historical terms'.6 Similar intermingling took place in Scotland 
during the 'Dark Ages' between 400 and 1057. 'The period has, with justice, been 
called "an age of migrations",' writes Michael Lynch, 'when the different tribal 
peoples--Picts, Scots, Angles, Britons and Scandinavians--who inhabited the 
mainland of modern day Scotland moved, fought, displaced and intermarried with 
each other'.7 And to these, of course, could be added the Norman English who were 
invited to settle in Scotland during the reign of David I (1124-1153), and who were 
themselves descended from Viking settlers in part of what is now France. 
In an extreme case like that of the native Australians it might be supposed that 
endogamy was maintained until the arrival of the European colonists, but in fact 
they too had interbred with Papuan and Polynesian immigrants many centuries 
before the Dutch or the British set foot on their continent.8 As the late Eric Wolf 
wrote of the ethnic composition of the world in 1400, 'If there were any isolated 
societies these were but temporary phenomena--a group pushed to the edge of a 
zone of interaction and left to itself for a brief moment in time'.9 In short, 
even before capitalism had penetrated all corners of the world in the search for 
markets and raw materials, the growth of trade, conquest and migration had 
already made the existence of endogamous gene pools increasingly rare. Of course, 
this does not mean that various groups have not claimed, and in some cases 
perhaps even believed, that they were descended from the pure stock of some 
ancestral group, but it is important to understand that these claims and beliefs are 
based on a myth of kinship, not a reality. 
Occupation: Like the modern notion of 'race', the origins of this second definition 
lie in the colonial expansion of capitalism outside of its European heartlands. From 
the origins of systemic racial slavery in the 16th century, 'race' has been a general 
term to override differences between different peoples by categorising them on the 
basis of physical characteristics, of which skin colour was the most important--
although, as we shall see below, the instances of racism directed against the 
Catholic Irish and by extension the Highland Scots were exceptions in that they 
were based on religion and language rather than physical appearance.10 There were 
massive differences in terms of social development between the Shona speaking 
peoples of southern Africa who built and lived in the stone city of Great Zimbabwe 
during the 15th and 16th centuries and the hunter-gatherers who inhabited 
Australia at the same time. Yet to ideologists of 'race' they were both 
indistinguishably 'black'. At first racism was used to justify the allocation of 
specific roles within the system during the process of primitive accumulation (ie as 
slaves), but latterly racism was used to consign members of 'races' who had 
migrated to the metropolitan centres to become either part of the reserve army of 
labour or workers with the worst pay and conditions in the labour force. 
'Ethnicity', on the other hand, was a term designed to distinguish between groups 
within overall 'racial' categories in those sections of the labour market in which 
they had established themselves. The capitalist mode of production requires the 
subordination of labour to capital, but in the European colonies it also required that 
the labour force was internally divided. As Eric Wolf notes, the allocation of 
workers to invented ethnic categories is doubly effective in this respect, first 'by 
ordering the groups and categories of labourers hierarchically with respect to one 
another', and second 'by continuously producing and recreating symbolically 
marked "cultural" distinctions among them'. On the one hand, groups were 
allocated specific roles both within the production process and within social life 
more generally. On the other hand, they were encouraged to identify with these 
roles and to defend them against other groups. Wolf is therefore right to say that 
these ethnic identities are not '"primordial" social relationships', but 'historical 
products of labour market segmentation under the capitalist mode [of 
production]'.11 Sometimes these built on existing division of labour within pre-
colonial society; sometimes they were wholly new and based on the division of 
labour within the new industries that the colonists established. 
In Rwanda and Burundi before colonisation there were three distinct groups--the 
Twas, the Hutus and the Tutsis. The most numerically significant were the Hutus 
and the Tutsis, membership of which passed down through the male side of the 
family.12 Is this an example of 'kinship' ethnicity which I earlier consigned to 
prehistory? In fact, although group membership at birth was based on that of the 
male parent, it was possible to move from the Tutsis to the Hutus in the course of 
life. All three groups spoke the same language, and the distinctions between them 
were principally based on the fact that they performed different social roles: the 
Hutu in farming, the Tutsi in cattle rearing and the Twa in hunting. A cattle owner 
was a Tutsi by definition, which meant that Hutus could 'become' Tutsis if they 
were able to accumulate sufficient wealth to become cattle owners themselves, a 
transition that was marked ceremonially. Since longhorn cattle were the main form 
of disposable property, people who owned cattle were therefore a significant part 
of the ruling class, but there were also Tutsis who owned few cattle and whose 
social position was proportionally less important. 
The situation is further complicated by the fact that Hutus were members of that 
section of the ruling class who owned large farms, without becoming Tutsis. As 
Charlie Kimber writes, 'The Hutu-Tutsi distinction in pre-colonial Rwanda and 
Burundi was not a simple class distinction (because you could be a poor Tutsi or a 
rich Hutu), nor was it an ethnic distinction (because you could be born into one 
group and die as another)'.13 It did, however, become an ethnic distinction with the 
arrival first of the German and then the Belgian colonial administrations. Under 
these regimes, real occupational stratification which designated people as being 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa was transformed into imaginary ethnic distinctions between 
separate 'tribal' groups, one of whom (the Tutsis) was privileged over the others in 
the colonial hierarchy and in the immediately post-colonial state. 
Rwanda shows how the existing occupational roles of existing populations can 
become the basis of new ethnicities imposed by colonialism. More commonly, 
ethnicities have developed among migrant groups responding to dislocation and 
industrialisation, as the emergence of ethnicity in the Gezira region of the Sudan 
after the beginning of cotton production in 1925 demonstrates. Some of the 
workers recruited by the British migrated for this purpose from various West 
African groups, all of whom were Muslims and most of whom spoke Hausa. 
Unlike the local Sudanese, these immigrants were already accustomed to wage 
labour in their own homelands, which had been industrialised earlier, and were 
consequently more likely to meet their quotas. The British tended to replace local 
workers with the immigrants. In response to their displacement, the Sudanese 
began to refer disparagingly to the West Africans as 'Fellata', a term which has 
overtones of slavish obedience. The West Africans in turn began to distinguish 
themselves from the Sudanese precisely on the basis of their supposedly greater 
capacity for hard work, a distinction linked to the adoption of a fundamentalist 
Islam far stricter than that practised by the Sudanese, and which was enshrined in 
their self description as 'Takari', a respectful term to describe pilgrims to Mecca 
from West Africa. As Eriksen concludes from this episode, 'Contemporary 
ethnicity or "tribalism" is not, in other words, a relic of the past but a product of 
modernisation processes leading up to the present'.14 
The sugar industry in the French colony of Mauritius provides an extreme example 
of how a wide range of characteristics can be fitted to occupational roles, 
becoming ethnicities as a result. Indians--members of a national group--were 
recruited as labourers in the canefields. Brahmins from among these Indians--
adherents of a religious sect--were made foremen. Creoles--descendants of slaves 
and consequently identifiable by their skin colour--tended to be skilled workers. 
Chinese or 'Mulattos' ('half-castes')--a national group and one defined by skin 
colour--held the middle managerial positions. The estate managers were invariably 
French settlers, who were both a national group and identifiable by their white skin 
but, needless to say, they were not considered to have an 'ethnicity'.15 
We might say, therefore, that the term 'ethnicity' is valid in this sense where it is 
used to describe the way in which existing occupational patterns in pre-capitalist 
societies were used by European colonists to classify the population as supposedly 
endogamous groups, or where the migrations set in train by colonialism had led 
groups to define themselves as either endogamous, or in possession of some 
quality or characteristic which distinguished them from the native populations 
around them. What has confused the issue is that the word 'ethnicity' was not in 
general use at the time these developments were taking place (roughly between 
1875 and 1945), but this would not be the first time that something has existed in 
the world before the language has been developed to describe it.16 Nevertheless, it 
could be usefully employed now in relation, for example, to the situation of 
Chinese traders in Indonesia or Korean traders in Los Angeles. But the term is 
generally not used with this degree of specificity. On the contrary, it is the third 
and final notion of 'ethnicity'--that of identity--which is currently sweeping all 
before it. 
Identity: In answer to the central question of why groups come to identify 
themselves as having a particular 'ethnicity', Anthony Smith has argued that an 
ethnic community--that is, a community whose members have not had their 
'ethnicity' imposed on them from outside, but distinguish themselves in this way--
has six main attributes: 'a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, 
shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common 
culture, an association with a specific "homeland", and a sense of solidarity for 
significant sectors of the population'.17 This attempts to incorporate a belief in 
kinship relations as part of the definition. It is not clear why these are 'ethnic' 
attributes rather than simply 'national' ones. Indeed, the definition of a nation given 
a few pages earlier by Smith could be substituted without affecting his argument: 
'A nation can therefore be defined as a named human population sharing an historic 
territory, common myths and historical territories, a mass public culture, a 
common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members'.18 (The 
similarity is perhaps unsurprising, given that Smith is attempting to argue for the 
importance of ethnicity in the formation of national identity.) It is perfectly 
possible for a particular social group to identify themselves as having an 'ethnic' 
identity without possessing all or any of the attributes listed by Smith, as the 
example of the Bosnian Muslims makes clear. Like all classificatory lists, the 
elements are completely arbitrary. Perhaps in realisation of this, some writers have 
abandoned any attempts at precise definition. 
In 1953 David Reisman became the first person to use the term 'ethnicity' to mean 
identity and he was quickly followed in this by other North American 
sociologists.19 In their hands the term was used to describe those groups who did 
not belong to the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) population--that is to say, 
everyone who was not descended from the original English, Scottish, and 'Scots' 
Irish (Protestant Irish) settlers. Exceptionally, German immigrants were allowed to 
merge with the WASPs, at least where they too were Protestants.20 Ethnicity was 
therefore reserved for 'minorities' identified by attributes as diverse as skin colour 
(blacks), religion (Jews) or country of origin (Italians). This lack of specificity 
brings to mind the famous conversation between Humpty Dumpty and Alice 
during her adventures through the looking glass: 
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, 'it 
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less.' 'The question is,' 
said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean so many different things.' 
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be the master-that's 
all'.21 
Stuart Hall, here playing the role of Humpty Dumpty, has offered the following 
definition of 'ethnicity': 'By "ethnicity" we mean the commitment to those points of 
attachment which give the individual some sense of "place" and position in the 
world, whether these be in relation to particular communities, localities, territories, 
languages, religions or cultures'.22 If the term encompasses 'communities, 
localities, territories, languages, religions or cultures', then it is difficult to see what 
could not be defined as 'ethnic'. A US sociologist, Abner Cohen, once proposed 
that City of London stockbrokers should be considered an 'ethnic' group by virtue 
of their group identity.23 He was not being entirely serious, but the proposal takes 
the logic of 'ethnic identity' to its conclusion in Bedlam. More seriously, the census 
which British citizens will be required to complete in 2001 asks respondents to 
define their own 'ethnicity' from a core list which consists of four nations 
(Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan), one continent (Asia) and two skin colours 
(black and white)--although these are subdivided, the first into 'Black: African', 
'Black: Caribbean' and 'Black: Other', and the latter into 'White: British' and 
'White: Other'. In fact, most uses of the word 'ethnic' are in place of some other 
word (like 'communities, localities, territories, languages, religions or cultures'), 
the use of which would give far greater precision of meaning. The result of not 
doing so, as the South African Marxist Neville Alexander rightly says, is 'to reduce 
the diverse reasons for the emergence of group solidarities to a single quality called 
"ethnicity", thereby obscuring precisely what has to be explained--the basis of such 
solidarity'.24 Ethnicity, in short, becomes a way of labelling people through the use 
of an ideological super-category that includes virtually any characteristic they 
might conceivably possess. 
There is a further problem. Hall assumes that 'ethnicity' can be divided into 'bad' 
and 'good' forms that more or less correspond to that of the majority populations of 
metropolitan imperialist states on the one hand and of their minority immigrant 
communities on the other. Of the former, Hall writes, 'In the face of the 
proliferation of cultural differences, and the multi-ethnic character of the new 
Britain, and threatened on the other side by the encroaching trauma of an emerging 
European identity, we have seen over the past decade a particularly defensive, 
closed and exclusive definition of "Englishness" being advanced as a way of 
warding off or refusing to live with difference--a retreat from modernity no 
exercise in managerial newspeak or the "new entrepreneurialism" can disguise or 
deflect'.25 Of the latter, however, we learn that it is 'not an ethnicity which is 
doomed to survive, as Englishness was, only by marginalising, dispossessing, 
displacing and forgetting other ethnicities'. On the contrary, these immigrant 
communities have a 'politics of ethnicity predicated on difference and 
diversity'.26 It is difficult to see how Hall could explain conflict between youth of 
Afro-Caribbean and south Asian descent on this basis (or indeed, that between 
those of Afro-Caribbean and Korean descent in Los Angeles). And while a model 
of 'ethnicity' derived from the British (or rather 'English') experience can certainly 
be generalised to other Western European imperialist nations like France, in a 
region like the Balkans, where historically there has never been a dominant 'ethnic' 
group, it has no explanatory power whatsoever. 
The internationalisation of capital, crisis and identity politics 
The editors of a recent reader on ethnicity begin by reflecting on the sudden 
upsurge of interest in their subject: 
For at least 150 years liberals and socialists confidently expected the 
demise of ethnic, racial and national ties and the unification of the world 
through international trade and mass communications. These expectations 
have not been realised. Instead we are witnessing a series of explosive 
ethnic revivals across the globe. In Europe and the Americas ethnic 
movements unexpectedly surfaced from the 1960s and 1970s, in Africa and 
Asia they have been gaining force since the 1950s, and the demise of the 
former Soviet Union has encouraged ethnic conflicts and national 
movements to flourish throughout its territory. Since 1990, 20 new states 
based largely upon dominant ethnic communities have been recognised. 
Clearly ethnicity, far from fading away, has now become a central issue in 
the social and political life of every continent. The 'end of history', it seems, 
turns out to have ushered in the era of ethnicity.27 
Why has the upsurge of 'ethnic' identification taken place now? For this sense of 
'ethnicity' to become established required two general conditions. The first 
condition is the need to distinguish one group from another. As Thomas Eriksen 
has stressed, 'Ethnicity is essentially an aspect of a relationship, not a property of a 
group.' In other words, cultural distinctiveness in itself does not confer 'ethnicity' 
on a group, but only when it is contrasted with the culture of another group: 'For 
ethnicity to come about, the groups must have a minimum of contact with each 
other, and they must entertain ideas of each other as being culturally different from 
themselves'.28 But for this to happen the differences must themselves be considered 
important, and there are only certain circumstances in which this is the case. The 
most important of these circumstances, and the second condition, is rapid social 
change. As Malcolm Cross notes, 'A man living in a world where change is largely 
absent does not need to be reminded of his culture in order to affirm his 
identity'.29 Where that change is destructive of established ways of life--and in 
some cases whole societies--and class politics does not offer an alternative, then 
distinguishing oneself as part of a specific group in order to struggle over the 
resources, or scavenge what you can from the rubble left by the onward march of 
international capital, may appear to be the only available option even where group 
membership may previously have meant little or nothing to the people concerned. 
Across the developing world in particular, the state is increasingly failing to deliver 
any form of social redistribution to the most disadvantaged. And some areas, most 
of which are in Africa, have seen not just increasing poverty but actual social 
collapse, brought on by economic crisis, which the state has been unable to 
prevent. In these circumstances an 'ethnic' community, often constructed by 
colonial powers that have long since departed, can provide what the state cannot. 
As David Brown notes, 'If the state claiming to be the cultural nation cannot offer 
the necessary protection, then it is the cultural nation claiming to be the potential 
state which offers the next best bet'.30 Rwanda provides a particularly tragic 
example of what can result from the residue of Western invented 'ethnicities' in a 
situation of acute social crisis. The genocide of 1994, far from being the expression 
of age old 'ethnic' animosities, was prepared by the destructive impact of 
colonialism on Central Africa. 
The left should be at the forefront of opposition to this, reasserting the realities of 
class against the myths of ethnicity, but all too often it is handicapped by its refusal 
to accept that 'identity' can ever be irrelevant, or mystified, or simply a cover for 
sectional interests. As Adam Kuper writes, 'So although the popular American 
notion of cultural identity has been stretched beyond ethnic groups to other kinds 
of minorities, it remains doubly essentialist: one has an essential identity, and this 
derives from the essential characteristic of the collectivity to which one 
belongs'.31 In most cases, however, there are no 'essential' characteristics--nor, 
indeed, have many of these collectivities existed for any length of time: 'In 
actuality, a sense of ethnic community can develop among individuals who neither 
share significant cultural attributes nor who are particularly distinctive from their 
neighbours; and it can refer to commonalties of circumstance which developed 
within living memory, and to attributes which clearly do not objectively derive 
from common ancestry'.32 The more developed world--in this case the Balkans--
provides us with the best example of how, unlike Central Africa, 'ethnicities' can 
arise with virtually no prior basis. 
Unlike their parents, or even their grandparents, many of the people who came to 
be described as 'ethnic Muslims' in Bosnia-Hercegovina had never been inside a 
mosque in their lives--at least until they began to be identified in this way for the 
purposes of persecution, when religion took on a new significance for them. As 
this example suggests, the distinction between 'imposed' and 'chosen' ethnic 
identities is not one which can be sustained, since there are many cases where 
groups which have been identified as possessing a particular attribute and 
discriminated against on that basis have subsequently chosen to militantly assert 
that identity in response to their oppressors. But this process is not inevitable. As 
Misha Glenny writes of the Bosnian Muslims, 'Although largely secular, the 
explicit religious origins of the Muslims' identity (they have no specific ethnic or 
linguistic criteria to differentiate themselves from Serbs or Croats, neither do they 
have a Belgrade or Zagreb to turn to for material, political or spiritual aid) have 
made the process of defining their nationhood exceptionally difficult.' It is 
interesting that Glenny, who is otherwise one of the most insightful commentators 
on the Balkan situation, sees this as a problem, rather than a hopeful basis for 
overcoming the divisions within Bosnian society, noting that 'many Muslims 
incline towards aspects of either Serbian or Croatian culture'.33 But before sides 
became fixed in the Bosnian war it was by no means certain that residual religious 
belief would be inflated until it became an imaginary essence by which people 
were defined: 'Before the war...when the Serbs still hoped to keep Bosnia in 
Yugoslavia, the media frequently highlighted similarities with the Muslims, while 
Croats often stressed that Bosnia had been part of historical Croatia and that most 
Bosnian Muslims were originally of Croatian descent'.34 In other words, these 
Muslims could have been absorbed into either Serb or Croat 'ethnicities', in which 
case the supposedly essential nature of their Islamic identity would never have 
arisen. 
The developed world has not remained untouched by the rise of--or perhaps one 
should say the retreat to--'ethnicity'. The crisis in Western Europe and North 
America is clearly not of the same order as that in the Balkans, still less Central 
Africa, but similar pressures are at work. Where reforms are increasingly hard to 
come by, two collective solutions remain for improving conditions. One is the road 
of class struggle, of forcing redistribution either directly from the bourgeoisie in 
the form of higher wages and better conditions, or indirectly by forcing the state to 
intervene through legislation or increased taxation. The other road, the road more 
frequently travelled, is not to struggle for redistribution from the capitalist class to 
the working class, but to struggle--or more precisely, to lobby--for resources to be 
redistributed from one section of the working class to another, or from one region 
to another, or from one 'ethnic' group to another. If groups can become politically 
organised, and consequently put electoral pressure on local or national politicians, 
they, or more usually their representatives, can campaign for 'affirmative action' on 
their behalf.35 
The latter strategy has a long history in post-war Britain stretching back to the 
1960s. It was only after the onset of economic crisis in the 1970s that it came to 
full maturity. Ambalavaner Sivanandan notes acidly the 'scramble for government 
favours and government grants...on the basis of specific ethnic needs and problems' 
by 'minority' groups following the Brixton riots of 1981 and the recommendations 
of the Scarman Report. The problem is not simply the compromises and 
downplaying of radical demands which are required to receive state funding, but 
the fact of competition between communities that increasingly divides them into 
rival 'ethnic' groups.36 It is not even the case that such funding as is available 
invariably goes to the working class areas, since the middle class can play the 
lobbying game to far greater effect, and will generally reap whatever benefits are to 
be had. 
It would be bad enough if accepting the existence of ethnicity merely meant 
condoning an endless splintering into rival groups to divide up the crumbs left by 
global capital, but there are even worse implications. The most serious of these is 
the relationship between ethnicity and racism. 
'Ethnicity' and the new racism 
For many on the left (as well as academics and officials in government agencies) it 
is perfectly acceptable to talk about ethnicity (without quotation marks), whereas it 
is no longer acceptable to talk about 'race'. There are, in other words, no such 
things as 'races', but there are such things as 'ethnicities'. As Steve Fenton writes: 
The term race is associated with mistaken science. It connotes physical 
difference and, frequently, colour. It is typically seen as malign, and racial 
ideologies have been associated with compulsion and regimes of 
oppression. By contrast, ethnic can be taken as an analytic term in social 
science, is often seen as the voluntary identification of peoples, and as (at 
least potentially) benign.37 
The problem is that the notion of ethnicity is all too often used to invoke precisely 
the qualities that used to be invoked under the now discredited notion of 'race'. To 
understand why, it is necessary to trace the previous major shifts in racist ideology. 
Marxist accounts of the origins and development of racist ideology tend to see 
three moments in the history of capitalism as decisive in determining its precise 
form. The first is slavery, and the need to justify enslaving millions of fellow 
human beings at the very moment when men were being declared equal and in 
possession of certain unalienable rights. The second is colonialism, and the need to 
justify the conquest and subsequent domination of foreign peoples. The third is 
immigration, and the need to justify discrimination against peoples who were 
usually encouraged to come to the metropolitan centres in the process of 
reconstruction after the Second World War. The respective justifications for the 
treatment of non-white populations differed in each case, moving from their less 
than human nature (making it permissible to enslave them) to their backwardness 
(requiring the guidance of the more advanced white 'races'), to the competition 
they posed to the white populations for jobs and housing (requiring an end to 
immigration and in extreme versions the repatriation of existing immigrants).38 In 
an important book published in 1981, however, the Marxist philosopher Martin 
Barker argued that we were now seeing the rise of a 'new racism' which: 
...can refuse insults: it need never talk of 'niggers', 'wogs' or 'coons'. It does 
not need to see Jews as morally degenerate, or blacks as 'jungle bunnies'. 
Nonetheless, in subtle but effective ways it authorises the very emotions of 
hostility that then get expressed in these terms.39 
The 'newness' of this racism is not in its reliance on the pseudo-sciences of 
sociobiology and ethnology for justification--pseudo-science has been a feature of 
racism from the invention of phrenology in the mid-19th century onwards--but in 
the claim that it demonstrates the social incompatibility of groups with different 
cultures. There are two historical precedents for this shift in meaning, in which an 
entire people were defined by virtue of what had previously been seen as an 
acquired characteristic--religion in the first, culture more generally in the second--
rather than biology. 
The first was in Ireland. In his work on the origins of racism, Theodore Allan 
defines racial oppression as the reduction of 'all members of an oppressed group to 
an undifferentiated social status, a status beneath that of any member of any social 
class within the colonising population'. Allan argues that racism originated not 
from innate propensities on the part of different groups to distinguish themselves 
from and discriminate against other groups (the 'psycho-cultural' argument), but as 
a conscious ruling class strategy to justify slavery as an economic system in the 
epoch where formal male equality was increasingly the norm (the 'socioeconomic' 
argument). Although his argument is mainly concerned with the racial oppression 
in the Americas, Allen sees a precursor of white colonial attitudes to the Native 
Americans and African slaves in the British (ie Lowland Scots and English) 
treatment of the Irish from the Anglo-Norman period onwards. With the 
Reformation, however, the religious difference between the Protestantism of the 
British settlers and the Catholicism of the Irish natives provided an additional 
element to the prejudices of the former: 'What had fed primarily on simple 
xenophobia now, as religio-racism, drank at eternal springs of private feelings 
about "man and god".' There were also more material reasons. As Allan strongly 
argues, the construction of 'religio-racism' against the entire Irish population was a 
conscious choice on the part of the English ruling class and its Scottish allies. 
Ireland was a crucial strategic territory in the struggle between Catholic and 
Protestant Europe, hence the impossibility of co-opting sections of the Catholic 
Irish ruling class for the purposes of social control: they could not be trusted to 
take the British side in the conflicts with Catholic Spain and France. The 
alternative was to attempt to convert the Catholic population to Protestantism, but 
this was unthinkable for most of the 18th century for two reasons. First, the 
Ascendancy comprised a relatively small minority of the population whose wealth 
and power would have been threatened if a majority had been allowed to share its 
legal privileges. Second, the majority of Protestants below the ruling class proper 
were Dissenters, most of them Presbyterians, and consequently excluded from the 
privileges available to communicants with the Anglican Church of Ireland. 
Mass conversion of the Catholic population was likely to lead to the converts 
joining the Dissenting branch of Protestantism rather than that of the great 
landowners, raising the prospect of the majority of the population uniting against 
the Ascendancy. After this came near to happening anyway in 1798, the British 
ruling class and its Irish extension responded by incorporating the Dissenting 
element through the Orange Order, but, more importantly, by shifting the nature of 
Catholic oppression from a racial to a national basis 'by the incorporation of the 
Irish bourgeoisie into the intermediate buffer social control system'. In short, once 
Catholics were allowed to participate in ruling Ireland, the system of 'religio-racial' 
oppression had to be abandoned.40 There are problems with this analysis, not least 
in the explanatory framework where changes are seen as the result of intentional 
manoeuvres by the ruling class. It is also the case that Irish people in Britain 
continue to experience racism as the dominant form of oppression. Nevertheless, 
Allan is clearly right to note that the use of religion--an attribute that we would 
now regard as 'ethnic'--as the basis of racial identification was rare at the time. In a 
situation where the oppressed population was the same skin colour as the 
oppressors, this shift was probably inevitable. 
The second precedent was in South Africa. One of the intellectual founders of 
apartheid (which means 'separate development') in South Africa was W W M 
Eislen. As Adam Kuper points out, Eislen rejected the notions of black inferiority 
dominant among his countrymen: 'Not race but culture was the true basis of 
difference, the sign of destiny.' But, he said, although different cultures should be 
valued in their own right, their individual integrity should also be preserved: 'If the 
integrity of traditional cultures were undermined, social disintegration would 
follow.' Segregation of the races was necessary not to preserve unequal relations 
between white and black, but the cultural differences between them.41 This was the 
theoretical basis on which apartheid was built. 
What is disturbing, given these precedents, is that the notion of 'ethnicity', 
particularly when it is used in its cultural sense, has increasingly become a 
substitute for 'race', a coded way of reinventing racial categories without making 
skin colour the key issue, in similar ways to those pioneered in Ireland and South 
Africa. And it is not simply racists who are responsible for this. The Race 
Relations Act of 1976 defines a 'racial group...by reference to one or more of the 
following: colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national 
origins'.42 A Commission for Racial Equality publication setting out the Racial 
Equality Standard for local government in Scotland asks that 'the Standard should 
be adopted and used both by authorities that have relatively substantial ethnic 
minority populations in their areas and those whose ethnic populations are smaller 
and more scattered'.43 The assumption that ethnicity represented a minority 
deviation from a majority norm (is there an 'ethnic majority'?) should in itself make 
us deeply suspicious, but it is only since the 1970s that the racist undercurrents of 
the term have become completely obvious. As Neville Alexander points out, 
quoting one of the US sociologists responsible for popularising the term during the 
1940s, 'ethnicity' is useful 'as a means of avoiding the word, yet retaining its 
meaning'.44 
Alex Callinicos rightly argues that the 'new' racism has arisen as a result of the 
discrediting of the notion of biologically distinct races, partly as a result of 
advances in knowledge which have undermined any scientific basis for such 
beliefs, and partly (and one suspects far more) as a result of the use to which such 
beliefs were put during the Holocaust. (Hence the modern convention, which I 
have followed here, of placing the word 'race' in quotes, indicating that the concept 
is wholly ideological and has no referent in the world.) Callinicos also argues, 
however, that the 'newness' of this racism is more apparent than real, since 
biological racism and, related to this, ideas of black inferiority, are still very much 
alive and, in any case, the 'new' cultural racism often involves the same type of 
stereotyping as the 'old' biological racism.45 There is some force in these criticisms. 
After reading the attempt by Charles Murray in The Bell Curve to explain black 
underachievement on the basis of genetic inheritance, or an attempt in The 
Independent to distinguish between Serbs and Albanians on the basis of their hair 
colour, it would be very foolish to predict the disappearance of biological racism. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the dominant form of racist ideology 
is taking a new form in which questions of 'ethnicity' are central. 
First, the emphasis on culture is not related to biology in the sense of indicating 
that some human beings are genetically superior or inferior to others, but in the 
sense that human beings are naturally hostile to those with different cultures: '...we 
may all share a common human nature, but part of that very shared nature is the 
natural tendency to form bounded social units and to differentiate ourselves from 
outsiders'.46This has become part of the discourse even of the extreme right. 
During the campaign which preceded the elections to the European Parliament on 
10 June 1999, a British National Party leaflet intended for distribution across 
Scotland called for opposition to the 'uprooting of our culture and to mass 
immigration', and support for 'the preservation of our unique Scottish identity 
within a free Britain'. Voters were invited to find out more about the fascist 
election campaign to save sterling and 'to preserve the cultural and ethnic identity 
of Scotland and the British people'.47 The object here is to bait the hook that 
catches the unwary with references to culture and ethnicity that make a point 
of not referring to racial stereotypes. 
Second, and more importantly, we are seeing the naturalisation of 'ethnic' 
characteristics. Attributes or properties like religion or language that were once 
regarded as socially acquired and consequently amenable to 
change are increasingly being treated as if they were naturally occurring and 
permanent. Indeed, in the case of nationalism, Tom Nairn has argued that they are 
naturally occurring and permanent: 
...differential cultural development (including language) may have had a 
function unsuspected by previous historians and theorists... If internal 
species-diversity through cultural means has always been 'human nature', 
presumably it will go on being so--in a way that has nothing to do with 
blood or race.48 
The idea supported by NATO and large sections of the liberal press--that different 
'ethnic' groups in the Balkans 'naturally' want to separate themselves from other 
groups, if necessary by terror and expulsion--is clearly one practical application of 
this theory. As long as ethnicity is assumed to have a real existence, then the 
pressure is always there to accept the logic of these supposed differences--that all 
the states in the Balkans must have a single dominant 'ethnic' group, no matter 
what the cost to the other groups who might have lived there for as long or longer. 
The same thinking lies behind the Northern Ireland peace agreement. Increasingly 
the language in which the conflict in the North is described abandons the notions 
of 'religious sectarianism' in which it was conducted for so long, and adopts that of 
'ethnic division' instead. Religious belief may decline with secularisation, as it has 
across most of the British Isles, but if religion has become part of your very nature, 
then all you can do is keep the two sides ('communities') hermetically sealed from 
each other. In other words, Protestant and Catholic religious beliefs have become 
the basis of 'ethnic identities', and these in turn are assumed to function in the same 
way as 'racial characteristics' once did. In addition to passing over the role that the 
British state has had in creating and maintaining the conflict, this ideological 
transformation also has another advantage for the ruling class in that it also 
absolves it from finding any permanent solution other than 'peaceful coexistence'. 
The question of language illustrates both how the state pretends to be 'even handed' 
while supporting the Unionist position, and the way in which the social divisions in 
the North are treated as 'cultural'. 
Since 1968 there has been a revival of interest in Irish culture, and of the Gaelic 
language in particular, among Catholics in the North. Since this interest has rightly 
been associated with political Republicanism, or at the very least with the desire to 
assert a political identity in the face of a state which denies or marginalises it, the 
educational and cultural activities involved have tended to be organised and 
financed by the communities themselves rather than by the state. In 1994, however, 
the government sponsored Cultural Traditions Group expressed its concern that 
Gaelic was associated with Republicanism and arranged to fund a trust to enable 
Protestants to learn the language in settings where they would not be troubled by 
these associations. As Bill Rolston points out, this is not 'symmetry' but 'an 
exercise in depoliticising a cultural movement. It is multiculturalism as counter-
insurgency.' The same Cultural Traditions Group also provides funding for the 
'Ulster Scots' language, whose supporters set up the Ulster Scots society in, by a 
curious coincidence, 1994.49 There is no such language (even 'Scottish Scots' is a 
dialect--in fact several dialects--of English) but such claims help to establish the 
myth that there are two parallel communities, with equivalent traditions, not a 
divided society in which one community is oppressed. 
The difficulty is that if we lack a word to describe the victims of racism, since we 
reject the concept of 'race', then the concept of ethnicity seems to offer an 
alternative. If what I have argued here is correct, however, ethnicity is rapidly 
turning into the thing it was originally introduced to oppose. What Adam Kuper 
has written of contemporary US anthropology seems applicable to much of the left: 
'It repudiates the popular ideas that differences are natural, and that cultural 
identity must be grounded in a primordial, biological identity, but a rhetoric that 
places great emphasis on difference and identity is not best placed to counter these 
views. On the contrary, the insistence that radical difference can be observed 
between peoples best serves to sustain them'.50 
'Ethnic' versus 'civic' nationalism 
There is, however, another danger with the use of 'ethnicity'. It is sometimes 
argued that 'ethnic' nationalisms that supposedly lead to the purging of entire 
populations as in Yugoslavia can be combated by an alternative 'civic' nationalism 
based on politics, not tribe. James Kellas describes this as '"inclusive" in the sense 
that anyone can adopt that culture and join the nation, even if that person is not 
considered to be part of the "ethnic nation".'51 'Civic' nationalism is frequently 
presented as the only true form of nationalism. Certain nationalisms--like that of 
Serbia--are said to be inherently oppressive precisely because they are based on an 
'ethnic' identity. The contrast is often made between this kind of nationalism and 
one described as 'civic' or 'social'--Scottish and Catalan nationalism, for example, 
are frequently described in this way, not least by Scottish and Catalan nationalists 
themselves. 
George Kerevan, former Trotskyist and currently the SNP spokes person for the 
environment, used his column in The Scotsman newspaper recently to distinguish 
the nationalism of his party from that of the Milosevic regime: 
There is nationalism in the sense it applies to Hitler or Milosevic. Call it 
ethnic or tribal nationalism. In fact, don't call it nationalism at all, because 
it's not about building modern nations. This is a reactionary, tribal, 
exclusive ideology espoused in times of economic and political change by 
those social orders who are being usurped or threatened by the process of 
modernisation... But there is another, totally different meaning of the word 
nationalism--nation building. Building the common institutions of an 
inclusive civil society that alone mobilises the talents, energies and co-
operation of the population to create a modern industrial society.52 
Note that nationalisms of which Kerevan disapproves (not least because they 
threaten to discredit his own nationalism by association) are dismissed as mere 
'tribalism'. Conversely, 'civic' nationalism is with equal frequency presented as not 
really being a form of nationalism at all. Only the 'tribalism' of Milosevic, which, 
as Michael Ignatieff puts it, 'legitimises an appeal to blood loyalty', is designated as 
such. In either event, the desired effect is to protect 'civic' nationalism from any 
suggestion that it appeals to blood and soil.53 Marxists do distinguish between 
different forms of nationalism, in particular between those of oppressors and 
oppressed, but this is not what is being argued here.54 What is interesting about the 
argument about 'civic' nationalism is that it is precisely the one that has historically 
been used to defend multinational oppressor nationalisms like those of Britain and 
the US. 
During the Scottish parliamentary elections of May 1999 The Daily Record issued 
a warning to its readers that the nationalism of the Scottish National Party could 
lead to the type of brutality exercised by the Serbs against the Kosovan Albanians. 
Here the British nationalism supported by both The Daily Record and its party of 
choice, the British Labour Party, simply disappears from view, despite the fact that 
it has been used to mobilise support for actual, as opposed to hypothetical, 
bloodletting for nearly 300 years and has recently been doing so again in the 
Balkans. The notion that British nationalism is not 'really' nationalism at all is of 
course a venerable theme of ruling class ideologues. It was first systematically 
expressed by the historian Lord Acton in an article of 1862 where he argued that 
the multinational character of the British nation ensured that 'freedom' (in the 
economic sense understood by mid-Victorian liberals) was secure: 'The 
combination of different nations in one state is as necessary a condition of civilised 
life as the combination of men in society.' One of the benefits conferred by this 
arrangement was that the 'intellectually superior' would elevate 'inferior races' 
hitherto corrupted by despotism or democracy. How different this beneficent 
fusion was to the situation elsewhere in Europe: 'Where political and national 
boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a condition 
corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow men'.55 
This analysis, or second or third hand versions of it, clearly informs the attitude of 
contemporary supporters of the British state, such as Gordon Brown, who are 
happy to dwell on their abhorrence of Scottish nationalism while simultaneously 
offering their support for British bombers whose sides are decorated with the 
Union Jack. Social psychologist Michael Billig has characterised the everyday 
nationalism of the established imperial states as 'banal nationalism': '"Our" 
nationalism is not presented as nationalism, which is dangerously irrational, 
surplus and alien.' Other people have nationalism; at best, 'we' have patriotism. 
Billig aims his comments specifically at the situation in the US, but they have a 
broader applicability: 'The wars waged by US troops; the bombing in Vietnam and 
Iraq; the bombast of successive US presidents; and the endless display of the 
revered flag; all of these are removed from the problems of overheated 
nationalism'.56 As these comments suggest, there are significant difficulties for 
socialists in attempting to use 'civic' nationalism as an alternative to 'ethnic' 
nationalism. Two in particular stand out. 
The first is that the category of the 'civic' avoids any engagement with the fact that 
there are certain activities which nation states must undertake, regardless of how 
non-ethnic they may be. As Billig complains, Ignatieff 'does not describe how 
"civic nationalists" create a nation-state with its own myths; how the civic nations 
recruit their citizenry in wartime; how they draw their boundaries; how they 
demarcate "others" behind those boundaries; how they resist, violently if 
necessary, those movements which seek to rearrange the boundaries; and so on.' 
The second is that, as we have seen, ethnicities can be invented to categorise 
groups by their enemies, or as self identification by those groups themselves, 
without any reference to real or imaginary kinship relations: culture can just as 
easily be made the basis of ethnicity as blood and soil tribalism. Precisely because 
ethnicity is a socially constructed category, however, ethnic categorisations can be 
produced anywhere with the same disastrous results that we have seen for the last 
ten years in the Balkans. Consequently there is no reason why 'civic' nationalism 
cannot be transformed into 'ethnic' nationalism in its turn under certain determinate 
conditions, just as it was in Germany--a modern, developed and highly cultured 
capitalist society--during the 1930s.57 This is a conclusion that adherents of 'civic' 
nationalism are, of course, most anxious to avoid. 
The example of Scotland is worth considering in this context for two reasons: first, 
because the historical record demonstrates how even this most civil of societies 
first rose on a sea of ethnic blood; second, because the contemporary situation 
contains all the elements for an 'ethnic' nationalism to arise--and in this Scotland is 
no different from most other Western European nations, although it tends to evade 
the scrutiny to which English nationalism is rightly subject. 
The modern Scottish nation was created through two processes: first, the 
destruction of the Highland society and the incorporation of its imagery into the 
national self image; second, the consolidation of that image through participation 
in the conquest and colonisation of North America and India. Both processes 
included ferocious episodes of what we would now call 'ethnic cleansing'. 
The Highlanders were considered to be no better than the Catholic Irish--indeed, 
their language and persons were often described in this way in both the Lowlands 
and England. One self proclaimed 'gentleman' of Derby, who had Highlanders 
quartered on him during the Jacobite occupation of that town in 1745, expressed 
every existing prejudice possible about the Highlanders in the space of one brief 
letter. First was their appearance: 'Most of the men, after their entrance into my 
house, looked like so many fiends turned out of hell to ravage the kingdom and cut 
throats; and under their plaids nothing but various sorts of butchering weapons 
were to be seen.' Even though these fiends in human form proceeded to eat and 
drink this gentleman out of house and home (although unaccountably failing to cut 
either his throat or those of his family), he could still find amusement in their 
religious observance: 'What did afford me some matter for an unavoidable laughter 
(though my family was in a miserable condition) was to see these desperadoes, 
from officers to the common men, at their several meals, first pull off their 
bonnets, and then lift up their eyes in a most solemn manner, and mutter something 
to themselves, by way of saying grace--as if they had been so many primitive 
Christians.' As if, indeed. His greatest abuse, however, is reserved for their 
language: 'Their dialect (from the idea I had of it) seemed to me as if a herd of 
Hottentots, wild monkeys in a desert or vagrant Gypsies had been jabbering, 
screaming, and howling together; and really this jargon of speech was very suited 
to such a set of banditti'.58 The conflation of 'Hottentot', 'monkey' and 'Gypsy' is 
suggestive and horrifying, but no different from what was commonly said about 
the Irish. And this is how they were treated in the aftermath of the Battle of 
Culloden. Discussing the brutality shown to the defeated Scottish Highlanders by 
the British army, the historian Alan Macinnes has written that the actions of the 
victorious Hanoverian troops involved 'systematic state terrorism, characterised by 
a genocidal intent that verged on "ethnic cleansing".'59 At the forefront of these 
atrocities were the Lowland Scots. 
As the warrior vanguard of British imperialism, however, the High landers 
behaved no better than the Lowlanders or the English. The Native Americans, to 
whom the Highlanders have been so frequently and inaccurately compared, might 
have expected different treatment at their hands than was generally dispensed by 
settlers from elsewhere in the British Isles. Alas, this was not the case. There were 
individual examples of intermarriage, or even of Highlanders adopting Native 
American lifestyles, but as James Hunter writes, 'Most North American Indian 
native peoples...would have been hard pressed to distinguish between the 
behaviour of Scottish Highlanders or any other of the various types of European 
with whom they came into contact.' In some cases this behaviour contained some 
particularly bitter ironies: 'Emigrants to Cape Breton Island, many of them 
refugees from clearances...showed not the slightest scruple about displacing the 
area's traditional inhabitants, the Micmac, from territories the latter had occupied 
for much longer than there had been Gaelic speaking Scots in Scotland'.60 Scotland 
was of course itself an imperial power, or, as an integral part of the British state, at 
least a major component of one. We are fortunate to have an excellent description 
of imperial rule in Asia by James Callender, a Scottish radical active during the 
1780s and 1790s: 
In Bengal only, we destroyed or expelled within the short period of six years 
no less than five million industrious and harmless people; and as we have 
been sovereigns in that country for about 35 years, it may be reasonably 
computed that we have strewn the plains of Indostan with 15 or 20 million 
carcasses... The persons positively destroyed must, in whole, have exceeded 
20 million, or 2,000...acts of homicide per annum. These victims have been 
sacrificed to the balance of power, and the balance of trade, the honour of 
the British flag.61 
Nor is the type of racism associated with empire something of the distant past. As 
late as 1923 a committee of the Church of Scotland, asked to consider the effects 
of Irish immigration to Scotland, produced a report to the General Assembly in 
which the Catholic Irish were described as 'a people by themselves, segregated by 
reason of their race, their customs, their traditions, and, above all, by their loyalty 
to their church'. The Scottish and Irish 'races' could never mix, or even live 
together, because: 
The Irish are the most obedient children of the Church of Rome; the Scots 
stubbornly adhere to the principles of the reformed faith [Protestantism]. 
The Irish have separate schools for their children; they have their own clubs 
for recreation and social intercourse; they tend to segregate in communities, 
and even to monopolise certain departments of labour to the exclusion of 
Scots.62 
It should be obvious, therefore, that it is historically inaccurate to claim that the 
Scottish nation has had a purely 'civic' national identity, and it is politically myopic 
to imagine that a full blown 'ethnic' nationalism could not re-emerge here under 
certain conditions. The materials are there in the traditions of Protestant 
sectarianism, militarism, or even simply 'whiteness'. On the latter point it is worth 
noting that the Commission for Racial Equality reported in May 1999 that Scotland 
had 1,087 recorded racial incidents during 1997-1998, compared to 441 in Wales 
and 13,437 in England. Although Scotland is home to only 2.1 per cent of 'ethnic 
minorities' in Britain, it recorded 7.3 per cent of all racially motivated incidents. In 
central Scotland, where the majority of incidents were reported, the percentage was 
15 times higher than in central London. None of these remarks are intended to 
contribute to The Daily Record style hysteria about Scottish nationalism. The 
chances of an ethnic national movement arising in the near future strike me as 
unlikely, and the Scottish National Party is equally unlikely to be a vehicle for such 
a nationalism should it arise, but it is necessary to remind ourselves that there are 
no nations on earth, be their nationalisms ever so 'civic', where 'ethnic' divisions 
could not be invented and 'cleansing' imposed if the material conditions were right. 
Conclusion 
It could be argued that I am displaying too great a concern with mere terminology 
and, given the way in which the academic left is currently obsessed with language, 
this would be an understandable response. Nevertheless, the dire political 
consequences that have previously followed the widespread adoption of certain 
terms ('patriarchy', for example) tend to suggest that terminological shifts not only 
register changed ways of thinking, but also encourage such changes. As the 
Russian Marxist Valentin Voloshinov wrote, 'The word is the most sensitive index 
of social changes', and if, as Voloshinov also suggests, the word is 'an arena of 
class struggle', then it is high time that we began to wage it over the word 
'ethnicity'.63 
In his recent book on culture, Adam Kuper concludes with sentiments that are 
equally relevant to the discussion of ethnicity: 
...unless we separate out the various processes that are lumped together 
under the heading of culture, and look beyond the field of culture to other 
processes, then we will not get very far in understanding any of it. For the 
same sort of reason, cultural identity can never provide an adequate guide 
for living. We all have multiple identities, and even if I accept that I have a 
primary cultural identity, I may not want to conform to it. Besides, it may 
not be very practical. I operate in the market, live through my body, struggle 
in the grip of others. If I am to regard myself only as a cultural being, I 
allow myself very little room to manoeuvre, or to question the world in 
which I find myself. 
Kuper notes that there is a final objection to defining ourselves in this way, which 
he describes as 'moral', but which is actually political: 'It tends to draw attention 
away from what we have in common instead of encouraging us to communicate 
across national, ethnic and religious boundaries, and to venture between 
them'.64 Although rendered in liberal individualistic terms, this is well said. For 
socialists, the aim is to overcome the divisions which are increasingly described as 
'ethnic' by removing the oppressions that give them significance, not to perpetuate 
or add to them. This may mean supporting oppressed nations or peoples, but the 
notion of 'ethnicity' is ultimately a means of dividing people up into ever more 
arbitrary classifications. At best, under the guise of celebrating 'cultural difference', 
it only obscures what most working people, which is most people, have in common 
by emphasising relatively superficial aspects of our social world. At worst, in a 
struggle for scarce resources such as that currently being played out in the Balkans, 
it can be used as a means of marking down certain people for persecution. As I 
have tried to suggest, there is no reason why we in Britain should feel complacent 
about the implications of 'ethnic cleansing' for ourselves. The necessary elements 
of 'ethnicity' can always be assembled from whatever historical relics are lying 
around, if economic crisis and social collapse are sufficiently severe. The 
anthropologist Marcus Banks wrote recently of ethnicity: 'Unfortunately...it is too 
late to kill it off or pronounce ethnicity dead; the discourse on ethnicity has 
escaped from the academy and into the field'.65This is too pessimistic. To dispense 
with the concept, we must first dispense with the social conditions that require the 
thing to which it refers, but it is possible to make a start. To paraphrase Alasdair 
MacIntyre in another context, understanding the uses to which 'ethnicity' has been 
put leads comprehensively to the conclusion that it is a term which no honest 
person should continue to use.66 
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